Front Row Motorsports’ purchase of a charter from Stewart-Haas Racing in April must be immediately approved by the sanctioning body, according to the court presiding over the NASCAR antitrust lawsuit. Last season, Noah Gragson drove the charter, which was most recently known as the No. 10 vehicle. NASCAR moved to have that order postponed until the outcome of the appeal it planned to submit on the merits, despite Judge Kenneth D. Bell’s Wednesday ruling. NASCAR reasoned that if they won the appeal, it would be difficult to reverse the transfer of the SHR charters.
Additionally, 23XI and Front Row were granted de facto charter status for the 2025 season as a result of the ruling. The judge made that finding because Tyler Reddick’s contract contained an opt-out clause that would have taken effect in the event that 23XI lacked a charter. Bell also found that NASCAR had violated federal antitrust law and engaged in anticompetitive behavior by including a phrase in the charter agreements that tried to stop teams from suing them.
According to Bell, the decision was reached to put the parties in a status quo situation as they were during the summer until the legal procedure was concluded. Bell also set December 1, 2025, as the date of the case’s trial. The only change Bell made to the ruling was to compel NASCAR to accept the Stewart-Haas and Front Row deal. It will need to be motioned individually since the arrangement that charter 23XI Racing entered into with Stewart-Haas was not covered in the initial round of back-and-forth filings. Anticipate that 23XI Racing will submit such a request to the court as quickly as feasible.
The judge continues to hold that the “release clause,” which prohibits teams from suing the sanctioning body, is probably a breach of federal antitrust law, notwithstanding NASCAR’s arguments to the contrary. “The Release is hardly a model of clarity, as the Court noted in its injunction Order, but Defendants’ view that the Release bars Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims in this action is crystal clear,” writes Bell. According to NASCAR, it is not illegal because teams agreed to the same lawsuit release clause in the 2016–2024 contract. According to the judge, there is probably an antitrust violation going on at the moment.
“Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims relate to ongoing and prospective conduct, even if we accept Defendants’ inapplicable arguments regarding “retrospective” claims.” Simultaneously, NASCAR has argued that Front Row and 23XI should not be allowed to file an antitrust lawsuit over the 2016 lawsuit, which also contained the same language prohibiting teams from suing, and that they should not be allowed to file an antitrust lawsuit over the 2025 agreement because they refused to sign it.
The judge criticized Chris Yates, the chief attorney for NASCAR, on the matter, arguing that there is a logical and maybe illegal conflict of facts. As part of the 2025 Charter Agreement, the Defendants’ arguments are actually said to have had an even wider impact on the Plaintiffs’ refusal to sign the Release. Because the Plaintiffs did not sign the 2025 Charter Agreements, they are not “efficient enforcers” of the antitrust charges, according to the Defendants’ response in their Answer.
Once more, the NCAA serves as a fitting analogy. Could the NCAA just inform all potential “student-athletes” that they are not permitted to participate unless they consent to absolving the NCAA of any antitrust liability? Obviously not. Simply put, NASCAR’s “release to race” condition is unacceptable and is probably illegal under antitrust law. By stating that the injunctive was restricted, the judge refutes NASCAR’s claim that the order compels the sanctioning organization to enter into a legally binding contract with parties challenging it on the grounds that certain terms are unlawful and anticompetitive.
Until a hearing that brings the issue closer to a conclusion before the 2026 season begins, Bell only compelled NASCAR to treat 23XI and Front Row as chartered for the 2025 season. The judge also rejected NASCAR’s claim that it was never given the opportunity to contest Front Row’s inclusion and asked the court to compel the Stewart-Haas transaction to be approved. Bell goes on to say that NASCAR’s time spent attempting to remove that request from the record ought to have been utilized to argue against it in court, and it was. “Defendants were aware of Plaintiffs’ request to allow Front Row to finalize the transfer of the SHR charter, which they had previously consented to.”
Furthermore, defendants have now at least twice submitted written arguments and supporting documentation to the court opposing this injunctive relief, notwithstanding the rule’s requirement that a decision on a preliminary injunction request be postponed until briefs can be filed. The Court has given careful consideration to all of the Defendants’ representations and has not limited their ability to express their views on this matter. During this time, the Court has halted the enforcement of this portion of the injunction.” According to the judge, NASCAR’s denial of the SHR to FRM charter transfer was occurring in real time during the first week of December, therefore the court had to make a decision.
However, it should be noted that this was prior to the two teams suing NASCAR. The judge goes on: “Also, the Court and the Parties did their best to brief and decide the dispute in time for the ruling to be meaningful. The communications and events related to the transfers of the SHR charters were occurring in real time throughout the first weeks of December (one of the letters that Defendants have filed is dated as late as December 17, 2024).”
The court accepts the plaintiffs’ argument that they felt there was no need to urge the court to require the defendants to approve the transfer of the SHR charter to Front Row at the time of their initial application for a preliminary injunction (October 9) and their subsequent motion (November 26). “NASCAR President Steve Phelps notified Front Row on September 11, 2024, that its SHR transfer was accepted and that Front Row only needed to provide the standard transfer paperwork.”Phelps reaffirmed the approval of the move. On November 14, 2024, Front Row filed the necessary paperwork. On December 5, 2024, NASCAR notified Front Row that it would not authorize the transfer following some further inquiries and submissions.
By trying to enforce the release clause, the judge is essentially stating once more that NASCAR appears to be in violation of antitrust law, therefore there is little chance of victory on appeal or justification for delaying the ruling. Additionally, the judge decided that allowing 23XI and Front Row to run under the provisions of the 2025 agreement would not immediately affect NASCAR. Judge Bell argues that because NASCAR has spent two months arguing to the court the benefits of the 2025 charter agreement for the sanctioning body and the teams, the organization cannot legitimately claim harm.
“In actuality, applying the charter terms to Plaintiffs’ race cars will not harm NASCAR at all,” Bell emphasized. NASCAR has consistently argued to the Court that the arrangements it has with 30 other cars represent a fair and advantageous agreement for all parties. Therefore, NASCAR cannot suffer “irreparable harm” as a result of the Court’s order compelling it to allow Plaintiffs to race chartered vehicles.
In addition, the judge states that, while this lawsuit is being handled, it is in the public interest of the consumer—in this case, the fans—that all the top drivers and cars compete in every race the following season. Bell said that there was no merit to NASCAR’s claim that it would have to divulge private information to the two teams that refused to accept the terms. Why? Before a trial next summer, the two parties will have to submit to discovery. Since Front Row and 23XI would already have access to all of those documents, NASCAR cannot in good faith be in danger of suffering immediate consequences for giving the teams the documents they would probably turn over this summer.